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From its beginnings, the economic analysis of law has traced the incentive
effects of liability on potential wrongdoers who pursue their material advan-
tage.1  Recently the economic analysis of law has turned to the study of social
norms.2  This paper relates these two literatures to punitive damages.  People
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1. For an overview of the vast economic literature on liability, see Robert D. Cooter, Economic
Theories of Legal Liability, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 11 (Summer 1991).  As for punitive damages, a sympo-
sium on the economic analysis of punitive damages was published in 1982 in Symposium, Punitive
Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1982).  The keynote paper is Dan Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the
Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1982).  My paper in this symposium, Robert D.
Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 79 (1982), begins a discussion of
the possibly central role of discontinuities in the law of negligence.  Another symposium on punitive
damages appeared in Symposium, Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 687 (1989), with economically
oriented articles by Bruce Chapman and Michael Trebilcock, Robert D. Cooter, Dan Dobbs, E. Don-
ald Elliott, Dorsey Ellis, David Friedman, Mark Grady, Peter Huber, George Priest, and Gary
Schwartz.  See also A. MITCHELL POLINSKY & STEVEN SHAVELL, A NOTE ON OPTIMAL FINES WHEN
WEALTH VARIES AMONG INDIVIDUALS (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No.
3232, 1990); Theodore Eisenberg, The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623
(1997); Ellis, supra; David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Le-
gal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1990); Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Ef-
ficiency in Tort Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1385 (1987); William Landes & Richard Posner, An Eco-
nomic Theory of Intentional Torts, 1 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 127 (1981); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998) [hereinafter Polin-
sky & Shavell, Punitive Damages]; Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1013 (1991); John E. Calfee et al., BMW v. Gore: Mitigating the Punitive Economics of Punitive
Damages (1997) (paper read at the meeting of the American Law and Economics Association in To-
ronto); Richard Craswell, When Is a Willful Breach “Willful”? General v. Specific Deterrence in Con-
tract Remedies (1996) (paper read at the meeting of the American Law and Economics Association in
Chicago); Andrew F. Daughtey & Jennifer Reingaum, Settlement, Deterrence, and the Economics of
Punitive Damages Reform (1997) (paper read at the meeting of the American Law and Economics
Association in Toronto).
2. Contributions to the burgeoning legal literature on social norms include ROBERT C. EL-
LICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); Lisa Bernstein, Social
Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 59 (1993); Robert D. Cooter, Decen-
tralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Mer-
chant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996); Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy,
23 S.W. U. L. REV. 443 (1994); Robert D. Cooter, Inventing Market Property: The Land Courts of
Papua New Guinea, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 759 (1991); Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social
Norms, 144 U. PENN. L. REV. 2181 (1996); Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict:  The Eco-
nomics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1984); Eric A.
Posner, The Regulation of Religious Groups, 2 LEGAL THEORY 33 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, Private
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who internalize social norms feel righteous anger against those who violate
them.  The institution of punitive damages allows judges and juries to express
righteous anger through speech and punishment.  Expression of emotions by
the court demonstrates the strength of its commitment to the law in question.
Perception of this commitment shapes the expectations of citizens and changes
their behavior.  In technical terms, expressions of emotion signal commitment,
and commitment provides a focal point in a game with multiple equilibria.
Conventional morality provides a basis for ordering wrongdoing by its seri-
ousness, but conventional morality does not attach precise punishments to
wrongs.  Consequently, people order wrongdoing consistently by its serious-
ness, but they attach inconsistent money damages to wrongdoing.  Social norms
provide a better guide to the need for punitive damages than to their extent.
Inconsistent awards of punitive damages muddle the message conveyed by the
courts concerning the seriousness of the wrong.  Courts should not ask juries to
determine the extent of punishment without providing instructions for its com-
putation from the facts of the case.
Consistency requires mapping wrongs ordered by seriousness into punish-
ments ordered by severity.  The goal of deterrence provides a basis for consis-
tent punishment.3  The court in a typical case should impose the minimum
punishment required to deter wrongdoing.  In jury trials, the court should in-
struct the jury on how to compute the minimum punishment required for deter-
rence.4  To compute the minimum, I distinguish between intentional and unin-
tentional wrongdoing by a theory of rational self-monitoring.  Imperfect self-
monitoring results in lapses that cause unintentional violations of legal obliga-
tions.  I show that liability for compensatory damages provides efficient incen-
tives for self-monitoring.  Deterring intentional wrongdoing, however, requires
additional liability.  In circumstances explained in Part V. B., optimal deter-
rence requires increasing compensatory damages by the reciprocal of the en-
forcement error.
                                                          
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Value Creation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions
(1997) (paper read at the meeting of the American Law and Economics Association in Toronto); Lisa
Bernstein, The Newest Law Merchant, Private Commercial Law in the United States (1995) (paper
read at the meeting of the American Law & Economics Association in Berkeley, CA); Robert D.
Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics (1997) (paper read at Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the
Economic Analysis of Law, conference at University of Chicago Law School [hereinafter Chicago So-
cial Norms Conference]); Dan Kahan, Social Meaning for Criminal Law (1997) (paper read at Chicago
Social Norms Conference); Timur Kuran, From Melting Pot to Salad Bowl: Ethnic Activity and Social
Induced Ethnification (1997) (paper read at Chicago Social Norms Conference); Randal C. Picker,
Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms (1997) (paper
read at the meeting of the American Law and Economics Association in Toronto); Eric A. Posner,
Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law (1997) (paper read at Chicago Social
Norms Conference); Cass Sunstein, Norms and Roles (1996) (paper read at the meeting of the Ameri-
can Law and Economics Association in Chicago).  For two recent symposia on the field, see Sympo-
sium, Social Norms, 144 U. PENN. L. REV. 2055 (1996); Symposium, Social Norms, Social Meaning,
and the Economic Analysis of the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 1998).
3. The most thorough and far-reaching application of deterrence theory to punitive damages is
found in Polinsky & Shavell, Punitive Damages, supra note 1.
4. See id. at 957 (providing sample jury instructions).
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II
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PRACTICE
“Punitive damages” usually refers to damages awarded to the plaintiff in a
civil trial in order to punish the defendant.  Private law in most countries pro-
hibits or narrowly circumscribes punitive damages, perhaps because civil pro-
cedures afford less protection to the defendant than criminal procedures.
United States statutes occasionally prescribe punitive damages, most notably in
antitrust cases where the law allows treble damages.5  However, statutory
authorization for punitive damages is unusual, and courts seem reluctant to
take the initiative in fashioning such remedies.  The common law traditionally
allowed punitive damages only in a narrow class of torts where the injurer typi-
cally harmed the victim’s dignity, such as slander.  American state courts and
legislatures, however, have expanded this practice beyond dignitary torts to al-
low punitive damages in many different kinds of civil cases, provided the de-
fendant’s behavior is bad enough.
The standard for “bad enough” is set so high that few cases qualify.  Most
states have a statute concerning the incidence and extent of punitive damages.
According to the usual formulation, punitive damages can be awarded when
the defendant’s behavior is malicious, oppressive, gross, willful and wanton, or
fraudulent.  The statutes typically identify factors for the court to consider
when setting the amount of punitive damages, including the seriousness of the
wrong and the ability of the defendant to pay damages.6
These phrases provide guidelines for courts, but the guidelines have never
been formulated into rules.  Punitive damages are supposed to bear a
“reasonable relationship” to compensatory damages, but the law does not pre-
scribe anything definite.  For example, the law does not say whether punitive
damages should exceed compensatory damages by two times or 100 times.  In
the typical case involving punitive damages, the jury is asked to decide whether
punitive damages should be awarded, and, if so, how much to award.  The jury,
however, does not receive definite instructions for answering either question.
Instructions are so thin that the jury’s intuitions determine damages.
Since juries receive minimum guidance from judges, awards are unpredict-
able. To illustrate, the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages
awarded recently by juries falls as low as 1/10 and rises to a number approach-
ing infinity as compensatory damages approach zero.7  In one recent case, the
                                                          
5. See Clayton Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
6. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (a) (West 1998).  The California Civil Code provides the fol-
lowing:  “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the defendant
has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may
recover damages for the sake of the example and by way of punishing the defendant.”  That is not
much detail to decide disputes involving millions of dollars.
7. The ratio of 1/10 is found in WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 305 tbl.10.7 (1987).
COOTER.FMT 09/17/98  8:08 AM
76 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 60: No. 3
jury awarded $3 billion in punitive damages.8  Many private insurance contracts
do not cover liability for punitive damages, and some states outlaw insurance
against liability for punitive damages.  Although rarely awarded, punitive dam-
ages represent a significant risk to some American defendants.  Little wonder
that defendants continue to argue (without success so far) that punitive dam-
ages fall under the prohibition of excessive fines by the Eighth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.9  Jury intuition about the extent of punishment
provides an uncertain and unstable foundation for law.
III
WHY PUNISH?
In economic models of liability, “perfect compensation” leaves the victim
indifferent between no harm and harm with compensation.10  In other words,
perfect compensation restores the victim to the same indifference curve as if no
injury had occurred.  A liability system with perfect compensation would make
victims indifferent about the behavior of injurers.  If victims are indifferent,
then injurers should be free to decide how to act.  These facts pose the theo-
retical question, “Why not permit everything and hold injurers liable for the
consequences?”  To develop the foundation for a theory of punitive damages, I
will sharpen this question and answer it.
A.  Internalize or Deter?
Permission to do something, provided that one pays a price set by the court,
has been called a liability right.  To illustrate, companies may be permitted to
engage in activities that create a nuisance provided that they compensate the
victims.11  Alternatively, law may forbid people to harm others and punish
those who intentionally violate the prohibition.  To illustrate, law and morality
forbid people to commit fraud or drive recklessly.
Liability rights and prohibitions locate decisions differently.  For a liability
right, the injurer is free to decide whether or not to act, provided he pays dam-
ages.  In contrast, punishment subordinates the individual’s freedom to the
group’s judgment about right and wrong.  With a liability right, perfect com-
pensation internalizes the harm caused by the injurer.  With a prohibition,
punishment ideally deters wrongdoing.
To understand deterrence, consider the parallel between victim’s compen-
sation and injurer’s disgorgement.  Disgorgement makes the injurer give up his
                                                          
8. The $3 billion dollar award was reduced on appeal in Pennzoil v. Texaco, 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex.
App. 1987).  For an analysis of the litigation between Pennzoil and Texaco, see Robert Mnookin &
Robert Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Market Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA.
L. REV. 295 (1989).
9. See Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
10. The concept of perfect compensation is explained and developed in several passages in
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 297-98, 363-65, 444-48 (1996).
11. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., Inc., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873 (N.Y. 1970).
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gains from the injury.  “Perfect disgorgement” is a sum of money that leaves
the injurer indifferent between the injury with liability for damages or no in-
jury.12  In other words, perfect disgorgement restores the injurer to the same in-
difference curve as if no injury had occurred.  Damages that exceed the amount
required for perfect disgorgement are extra-disgorging.  Extra-disgorging dam-
ages make the injurer worse off than if he had not committed the injury.
By definition, an injurer is indifferent between no injury and an injury with
liability for perfectly disgorging damages.  Consequently, an injurer who faces
certain liability for extra-disgorging damages prefers not to cause the injury.
When the liability system works perfectly, liability for extra-disgorging dam-
ages deters intentional wrongdoing.
TABLE 1
LIABILITY RIGHT VERSUS PROHIBITION
Injurer’s Act Law’s Goal Damages to Achieve Goal
Liability Right Permitted Internalize Perfect Compensation
Prohibition Forbidden Deter Extra-disgorging
Table 1 summarizes the contrast between a liability right and a prohibition.
A liability right gives freedom to injurers and perfect compensation fully pro-
tects victims.  Furthermore, when the liability system works perfectly, liability
for perfectly compensatory damages causes a potential injurer to balance his
costs of precaution and the victim’s costs of harm, as required for economic ef-
ficiency.  Liability for perfectly compensatory damages provides incentives for
efficient precaution by injurers in many economic models.13  In contrast, a pro-
hibition forbids wrongdoing and deters it with extra-disgorging damages.
Notice that Table 1 implicitly suggests two different baselines for deciding
when damages become punitive.  Damages may be described as punitive when
they exceed the amount required to compensate the plaintiff for the injury.
According to this definition, punitive damages are extra-compensatory.  Alter-
natively, damages may be described as punitive when they exceed the amount
required for the injurer to disgorge the gain from wrongdoing.  According to
this definition, punitive damages are extra-disgorging.  The two definitions of
punishment reverse the role of victim and injurer in the baseline.
Although similar in form, damages computed under one definition do not
generally equal damages computed under the other definition.  The two con-
                                                          
12. Perfect disgorgement is defined and analyzed in Robert D. Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman,
The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045
(1991).
13. The first formalization of this idea for torts is in John Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of
Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1973).  Perfect compensation also destroys the victim’s incentives for
precaution.  Any modern discussion of bilateral precaution explains the problem.  For example, see
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 10, at 365, 409, 435.
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cepts of punishment are not materially equivalent.  When the goal of law is to
deter injurer’s from committing forbidden acts, the injurer’s gain, not the vic-
tim’s loss, provides the correct baseline for computing damages.  Under ideal
conditions—including certain liability—a small increment added to perfectly
disgorging damages will deter.  When liability is uncertain, the increment must
increase enough to offset the uncertainty, as I discuss later in detail.  The ideal
conditions, which are unrealistic but useful for analysis, include no court errors
and actors who are rational, informed, and solvent.
B.  Channeling Transactions
Now I return to the question, “Why not permit everything and hold injurers
liable for the consequences?”  A variety of answers can be found both within
and outside of the framework of economic analysis.  Some scholars who work
within the economic framework concentrate on the desirability of channeling
transactions through markets rather than courts.  To illustrate, the law prohib-
its you from stealing my golf clubs.  If you want them, you have to buy them
from me.  Alternatively, the law might permit you to steal my golf clubs and
compensate me.  For most transactions, the market determines values at less
cost than a court.  For example, the market determines how much I value my
golf clubs at less cost than a court can determine liability.  So protecting my en-
titlement by a property right rather than a liability right saves transaction costs
by channeling transactions into markets and away from courts.  When markets
can price goods at lower transaction costs than courts, prohibitions provide a
more efficient structure for transactions than liability.
C.  Uncompensable Losses
Instead of the transaction structure, I focus on a different reason why effi-
ciency sometimes requires prohibitions rather than liability.  Implementing per-
fect compensation is easy when the harmed object has a perfect substitute in
the market.  To illustrate, if one motorist destroys another’s automobile, the
market price enables the court to estimate perfectly compensatory damages.
Implementing perfectly compensating damages is difficult when the injury
harms a unique object with an imperfect substitute, such as an oil painting.  Im-
plementing perfect compensation may be impossible when the injury seriously
harms a subject rather than an object.  To illustrate, a parent may feel that no
amount of money could make him indifferent over the death of his child.  If a
grieved parent feels that way, then perfectly compensatory damages are impos-
sible in principle.  Impossibility comes from the fact that the parent cannot
make any sense out of the idea of being indifferent between his child and
money.  (Some scholars conclude that money and children’s lives are incom-
mensurable.14)
                                                          
14. See Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 1993 DUKE L.J. 56, 67; Cass
R. Sunstein, Is the Rule of Law Good? (1994) (paper read at first draft of Tanner lectures).  See gener-
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D.  Liability for Uncompensable Losses
In spite of this fact, courts routinely award “compensatory damages” to the
victims of uncompensable harms.  In cases where compensation is impossible,
the phrase “compensatory damages” badly misleads people concerning the
purpose of damages.  Legal language obscures another purpose for damages in
such cases.  The purpose is to deter people from exposing others to unreason-
able risks.  I will explain how to implement this goal through damages.
Social norms often restrict and regulate behavior that causes uncompensa-
ble losses.  To illustrate, conventional morality forbids assault.  Similarly, cur-
rent social norms in California apparently require the driver to make sure that
all children in cars use seat belts.  Social norms, however, often do not stipulate
the damages owed to victims of wrongdoing.  To illustrate, social norms do not
specify how much to compensate someone who was punched in the nose or who
lost a child in an accident.  Given these facts, juries find obligations more relia-
bly than they do damages.  For example, juries feel more confident about an
obligation to reduce a particular risk to a child’s life than about the damages
that would compensate the parent if the risk materializes.
When compensation is impossible, an appropriate goal of liability law is to
deter wrongdoers from violating community standards.  Setting damages at the
appropriate level makes rationally self-interested people conform to social
norms.  To illustrate, successful deterrence prevents adults from exposing chil-
dren to more risk than allowed by social norms.  I can describe the method of
computing damages for deterrence by using Judge Hand’s notation from United
States v. Caroll Towing, Co.15
Let B denote the burden of care, let p denote the reduction in the probabil-
ity of an accident caused by taking B, and let L denote liability.  Judge Hand
had in mind a situation where no community standard exists.  If there is no
community standard, Judge Hand required the actor to take precaution until
the burden is at least as great as the reduction in expected liability: B>pL.
I have in mind a different situation where a community standard exists but
the harm is uncompensable.  The community standard establishes the burden B
whose omission constitutes negligence.  Objective facts establish the reduction
in the probability p of an accident caused by B.  Given B and p, the court
should compute L by solving L=B/p.  I call this approach the “risk equivalent”
method, because it aims for equivalence between money and the risk, not
equivalence between money and the loss.16
                                                          
ally Symposium, Law and Incommensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1998); Bruce Chapman, Law,
Incommensurability, and Conceptually Sequenced Argument, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1487 (1998).
15. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
16. I explain the “risk-equivalence” method for computing damages in COOTER & ULEN, supra
note 10, at 306-08.  The unfortunate phrase more generally used in the law and economics literature is
“hedonic indexes.”  For an account of their use, see W. Kip Viscusi, Comment on John Calfee and Clif-
ford Winston’s “The Consumer Welfare Effects of Liability for Pain and Suffering: An Exploratory
Analysis,” in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 175 (Martin Neil
Bailey et al. eds., 1993).  For an imaginative example of their use, see John E. Calfee & Clifford W.
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To illustrate, consider the computation of damages for the accidental death
of a child.  Courts find standards of negligence in social norms and refine them.
If social norms as found by courts require an actor to spend $100 on precau-
tions to reduce the probability of a child’s accidental death by .0001, then the
equivalent value of the risk equals $100/.0001, or $1 million.  In this example,
the burden B equals $100, the probability p equals .0001.  These facts imply that
the liability L should equal $1 million.
Rationally self-interested actors decide whether or not to conform to the le-
gal standard of care by balancing the costs of precaution and the expected costs
of liability.  The risk-equivalent method sets liability at the level that causes
such actors to conform to the legal standard.  When L=B/p, a rational actor will
pay up to B to avoid facing liability with probability p.  For example, when
faced with liability of $1 million, the rationally self-interested actor will spend
up to $100 to reduce the probability of being liable by .0001.  To illustrate con-
cretely, a profit-maximizing bottler of Coca-Cola will spend up to $100 on
quality control to reduce by .0001 the probability of being liable in tort for $1
million.17
Current regulations create incentives for irrational and inconsistent levels
of precaution.  To illustrate, Viscusi found that the cost per life saved by vari-
ous regulations varies from $100,000 for unvented space heaters to $72 billion
for the 1987 formaldehyde standard.18  The risk-equivalent method for com-
puting liability can help to rationalize precautions by providing uniform incen-
tives.  To illustrate, $1 million in liability for the wrongful death of a child cre-
ates incentives for firms to spend $100 on precaution to reduce the probability
of death by .0001, regardless of whether the firm manufacturers space heaters
or formaldehyde.
E.  Bad Names
Sometimes the legal methodology for computing compensatory damages
omits categories of harm.  To illustrate, the law may fail to compensate fully for
consequential damages, remote damages, economic losses, exposure to risk,
emotional distress, or pain and suffering.  To achieve the goal of internaliza-
tion, the law needs to fill the gap between allowed compensation and perfect
compensation.  One way to fill the gap is by allowing additional damages and
calling them “punitive.”
                                                          
Winston, The Consumer Welfare of Liability for Pain and Suffering: An Exploratory Analysis, in
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 133 (1993).
17. The same proposition can be stated in terms of “perfect disgorgement,” which I defined as the
damages that leave the injurer indifferent between doing right and doing wrong.  A rationally self-
interested actor must face damages of $1 million in order to be indifferent between committing a
wrong that results in liability with probability .0001 or doing right at a cost of $100.  A distinction can
be drawn between ex ante and ex post disgorgement.  From the ex ante viewpoint, perfect disgorgement
of the expected gain from wrongdoing requires damages equal to $1 million.  From the ex post view-
point, perfect disgorgement of the actual gain from wrongdoing requires damages equal to $100.
18. See W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U. CHI. L. REV., 1423, 1432-35 (1996).
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Gap filling was apparently one of the original inspirations for awarding pu-
nitive damages in common law cases involving dignitary torts.  To illustrate,
consider the difficulty of estimating the damages required to compensate per-
fectly for the indignity of getting insulted and punched in the nose while peace-
fully enjoying a beer in a public house.  Courts lack a methodology for com-
puting compensatory damages in such cases.  Punishment might fill the
methodological gap and provide damages approximating the amount required
for compensation.
Applying “punitive” to gap-filling damages spreads confusion.  If the law’s
goal is perfect compensation of the victim, then the court should not use lan-
guage suggesting that its goal is punishing the injurer.  Instead, the law should
adopt the best available methodology for implementing perfectly compensatory
damages and say so.  The best method to pursue a goal will advance it farther
than pursuing a different goal by a better method.
IV
WHEN TO PUNISH
Channeling activities into voluntary transactions and deterring uncompen-
sable harms sometimes requires backing prohibitions with penalties.  Now I
turn to the problem of when to impose punitive damages on wrongdoers.  One
writer has described a theory that judges and juries award punitive damages
when, upon hearing the facts, they grip the arms of their chairs and think, “Oh
my God!”19  This claim explains little and suggests much.  I will develop a the-
ory of punitive damages by trying to explain such behavior.
A.  Commitment and Indignation
Moral commitment increases trust, which makes cooperation easier and
more productive.  In a cooperative venture, people often get paid according to
their contribution.  Consequently a person who can signal moral commitment
often gains an advantage in cooperative activities.20  Signaling commitment is
difficult, however, because people can fake moral commitment.  Gaining an
advantage by commitment requires signaling that it is genuine.
Feelings can help to distinguish between fake and genuine commitment.
Genuine moral commitment has an emotional aspect.  People feel committed
to internalized values.  This connection between commitment and emotion has
a useful function.  Telling a cool lie is easier for many people than faking emo-
tion.  For example, a child who can tell a cool lie is often incompetent at faking
emotion.  Aspiring actors devote much time and effort to perfecting the art of
faking emotion.  Since faking emotion is difficult, the emotion attached to the
                                                          
19. See David M. Burrell, A New Approach to the Problem of Wilful and Wanton Misconduct, 1949
INS. L.J. 716, 723.
20. For a comprehensive examination of signaling commitment to social norms, see generally
ERIC A. POSNER, LAW, COOPERATION, AND RATIONAL CHOICE (1998).
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expression of moral commitment helps authenticate it.  According to one the-
ory, emotions evolved among people partly to provide the means to signal
commitment.21
Whereas economic rationality seems relatively cool, discussions of law can
become relatively hot.  The heat comes from the connection between emotion
and commitment.  People feel committed to values at issue in contested law,
such as abortion, discrimination, or even closing the range to cattle.  The pres-
ence of emotion suggests a prominent role in law for expressing internalized
values.  People who internalize social norms feel righteous anger against those
who violate them.  The institution of punitive damages allows judges and juries
to express righteous anger through speech and punishment.
B.  Systems of Social Norms
Punitive damages express indignation through the language of the law and
the magnitude of the punishment.  Expression of emotions by the court demon-
strates its commitment to the law in question.  Perception of commitment can
shape the expectations of citizens and change their behavior.  Usually, percep-
tion of the court’s commitment changes behavior marginally by deterring
wrongdoing.  Sometimes, however, perception of the court’s commitment
changes behavior dramatically.
The system of social norms determines whether signaling commitment
causes marginal deterrence or dramatic change.  With a uniquely stable equilib-
rium in the system of social norms, the law’s sanction changes behavior mar-
ginally.  In contrast, with multiple equilibria, some of which are unstable, the
law’s expression can sometimes change expectations dramatically and perma-
nently.  Jumps occur because the court’s commitment focuses expectations on a
new equilibrium.  If coordination problems prevent people from reaching a
higher standard of behavior to which they aspire, law can sometimes solve the
coordination problem by urging people to achieve the higher standard.
C.  Graphs22
Before turning to deterrence, however, I will elucidate the preceding discus-
sion of legal expression with the help of some graphs.  The reader who dislikes
graphs can skip to the next section.
Many productive activities require cooperation among people.  Norms pro-
vide a guide to organization and a basis for trust that facilitates cooperation.
Organized activity typically increases production above the level obtainable
without organization.  Some organizations, however, are superior to others.
Social norms do not automatically prescribe the most productive organization.
In addition, organizations distribute power and status.  Social norms do not
                                                          
21. See ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE
EMOTIONS (1988).
22. This section is based upon Robert D. Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. (forthcoming 1998).
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automatically distribute power and status fairly.  I will briefly describe some
formal characteristics of norms relevant to their efficiency and fairness.
A social norm imposes an obligation that partitions the set of possible ac-
tions into permitted and forbidden zones.  People conform to a norm by staying
in the permitted zone, and people violate a norm by entering the forbidden
zone.  When an actor adopts the pure strategy of doing right or the pure strat-
egy of doing wrong, the resulting payoff depends upon the strategy pursued by
others.  I assume that doing right contributes to production by increasing trust
and cooperation, whereas doing wrong reduces production by undermining
trust and cooperation.  For example, truth-telling and promise-keeping con-
tribute to production by solving the principal-agent problem.
Given a socially productive norm, an increase in the proportion of wrong-
doers decreases the productivity of cooperative relationships.  A decrease in
productivity reduces the payoffs to wrongdoers and rightdoers.  Although eve-
ryone’s payoffs fall, the reduction may be different for wrongdoers and right-
doers.  These differences have important consequences for equilibria in the sys-
tem of norms.  In evolutionary equilibrium, all behavior that persists yields the
same objective payoff.  In one common pattern, as the proportion of wrongdo-
ers increases, the payoffs to wrongdoers fall faster than the payoffs to rightdo-
ers.  This possibility results in a stable interior equilibrium.
Figure 1 depicts this possibility.  The vertical axis represents the payoff, the
horizontal axis represents the proportion of wrongdoers, one curve represents
payoffs for conforming to the norm, and the other curve represents payoffs for
violating the norm.  The intersection in the curves depicts an interior equilib-
rium where rightdoers and wrongdoers receive the same expected payoff.
FIGURE 1
STABLE EQUILIBRIUM
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Now consider why the equilibrium is stable.  If the proportion of wrongdo-
ers increases beyond the equilibrium level, the payoff to rightdoers rises above
the payoff to wrongdoers.  With rightdoers receiving higher payoffs, some
wrongdoers change their behavior.  The number of wrongdoers declines until
equilibrium is restored.  Conversely, if the proportion of wrongdoers decreases
below the equilibrium level, the payoff to wrongdoers rises above the payoff to
rightdoers, so wrongdoers will increase in number until equilibrium is restored.
As explained, stability results from assuming that an increase in the propor-
tion of wrongdoers harms wrongdoers more than rightdoers.  Now change the
assumptions and assume that an increase in the proportion of wrongdoers
harms wrongdoers less than rightdoers.  Figure 2 depicts this situation.  The in-
tersection of the curves represents an interior equilibrium that is unstable.  Be-
ginning from the interior equilibrium, an increase in wrongdoers causes the
payoffs of wrongdoers to rise above the payoffs to rightdoers, so the number of
wrongdoers continues to increase.  The process ends at the stable equilibrium
at the lower right corner where everyone does wrong.
FIGURE 2
UNSTABLE EQUILIBRIUM
Conversely, beginning from the unstable interior equilibrium, a decrease in
wrongdoers causes the payoffs of wrongdoers to fall below the payoffs to right-
doers, so the number of rightdoers increases.  The process ends at the stable
equilibrium at the upper left corner where everyone does right.
For norms of cooperation, the curves expressing payoffs to rightdoers and
wrongdoers slope down to express the loss in productivity as the proportion of
wrongdoers increases.  Theory, however, does not prescribe the gradient of the
curves.  The curves might intersect more than once.  Figure 3 depicts this possi-
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bility.  Figure 3 has a stable interior equilibrium with few wrongdoers, an un-
stable interior equilibrium with many wrongdoers, and a stable corner equilib-
rium with all wrongdoers.  In Figure 3, the system stabilizes when few people
(25%) do wrong or when everyone (100%) does wrong.
FIGURE 3
MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA
Now I discuss how law can influence the systems of social norms depicted in
Figures 1, 2, and 3.  Assume that lawmakers raise the social obligation to the
level of a legal obligation and attach a sanction to its violation.  The legal sanc-
tion causes the wrongdoer’s payoff curve to shift down in the figures.  If the
wrongdoer’s curve shifts down in Figure 1, then the equilibrium moves to the
left.  Because wrongdoing decreases, the new equilibrium has more cooperation
and higher production.  Given a stable interior equilibrium in the system of so-
cial norms, imposing legal sanctions deters wrongdoers marginally.
Deterrence, however, has different consequences in Figure 2.  Recall that
the interior equilibrium is unstable.  Since the system does not settle at the in-
terior equilibrium, small changes in the interior equilibrium have little or no
consequences for the social system.23  Attaching a legal sanction to the social
obligation causes the wrongdoer’s payoff curve to shift down in Figure 2.  A
downward shift in the wrongdoer’s payoff curve shifts the interior equilibrium
and does not change the corner equilibria.  Either everyone continues doing
wrong, or else everyone continues doing right.  In either case, the imposition of
a legal sanction has no deterrence effect.
                                                          
23. Changes in the interior equilibrium affect the size of the shock needed to cause the system to
jump from one corner equilibrium to another corner equilibrium.
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Besides deterring wrongdoing, law coordinates expectations.  Given a sys-
tem of social norms with multiple equilibria, the coordination effects of law can
be dramatic.  In Figure 2, everyone does right or everyone does wrong.  As-
sume that everyone does wrong.  Now the state raises the social obligation to
the level of law.  If people respect law, enacting the obligation into law may
cause people to change their expectations.  If people think everyone else will
switch from doing wrong to doing right, then the prophecy will fulfill itself.
Enacting the law will cause the equilibrium to jump from the right corner,
where everyone does wrong, to the left corner, where everyone does right.
The expressive theory of law represents an alternative to the deterrence
theory of law.  According to the expressive theory of law, the expression of so-
cial values is an important function of the courts,24 or possibly the most impor-
tant function of the courts.25  The classical formulations, however, did not ana-
lyze the behavioral consequences of expressive law.  The main finding of such
an analysis is that, given multiple equilibria in a system of social norms, expres-
sion of legal commitments can cause dramatic jumps in behavior.
I have explained that legal sanctions change behavior marginally in a stable
system of social norms, and legal expression can change behavior non-
marginally in an unstable system of social norms.  In reality, normative systems
are likely to be mixed, as depicted in Figure 3.  In mixed systems of social
norms, law can have deterrence effects and expression effects.  To illustrate by
using Figure 3, assume that the system of social norms is stuck at the right cor-
ner where 100% of the actors do wrong.  A stable interior equilibrium exists
where only 25% of the actors do wrong.  Everyone’s payoff would increase if
the system could move from the corner equilibrium to the stable interior equi-
librium.
Notice that the unstable, interior equilibrium in Figure 3 occurs with 70%
wrongdoers and 30% rightdoers.  In order to move to the stable interior equi-
librium, at least 31% of the actors must change strategies and do right.  Once
31% of the actors do right, rightdoers will continue to increase until 75% of the
actors do right.  Assume that enacting a law induces at least 31% of the citizens
to change, so the system in Figure 3 moves to the stable interior equilibrium.
Although improvement is dramatic, 25% of the actors continue doing wrong.
Further reductions in wrongdoing would require deterrence.  Supplementing
social sanctions with legal sanctions shifts down the curve representing ex-
pected payoffs to wrongdoers in Figure 3, thereby reducing the equilibrium
number of wrongdoers.  Thus, the combination of expression and deterrence
brings wrongdoing down to a low level.
                                                          
24. For an argument that expressing social judgments is one of the uses of criminal law, see H.L.A.
HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968).
25. This was apparently Durkheim’s view, as analyzed in DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND
MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY 23-46 (1990).  Note that I draw no connection be-
tween the emotive theory of law, which belongs to jurisprudence, and the emotive theory of the
meaning of value, which belongs to epistemology.
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I have explained how law can change behavior dramatically in a social sys-
tem with multiple equilibria.  In such a social system, law can also fail dramati-
cally.  To illustrate concretely by Figure 3, recall that dramatic improvement
occurs when, beginning from a situation in which everyone does wrong, enact-
ing the law causes at least 31% of the actors to change and do right.  Dramatic
failures occur if less than 31% of the actors change and do right.  Assume that
enacting the law causes 25% of the actors to change and do right.  The actors
change from wrong to right because they expect other people to make the
change.  But not enough people make the change to sustain it.  In that event,
the system reverts to the original equilibrium where everyone does wrong.
In a system of social norms with a uniquely stable equilibrium, the law’s
sanction changes behavior marginally, but the law’s expression cannot perma-
nently change expectations or behavior.  In a system of social norms with mul-
tiple equilibria, the law’s sanction changes behavior marginally, and the law’s
expression dramatically succeeds or dramatically fails to change expectations
and behavior.  Using punitive damages for marginal deterrence risks little,
whereas using law expressively risks a lot.  The high risk of expression is that
law can change social behavior dramatically or discredit itself.
V
HOW MUCH TO PUNISH?
Given the complexity of coordination problems and the fragility of symbols,
I doubt that expressive theories of law can provide the basis for calibrating pu-
nitive damages.  If punitive damages are based upon expressive law alone, the
current problems of inconsistency have no remedy.  Inconsistent awards of pu-
nitive damages muddle the message conveyed by the severity of punishment.
For purposes of expression, the courts need a more consistent calibration of
punitive damages than an expressive theory can provide.  The goal of deter-
rence can provide a more consistent calibration of punishments.  I will analyze
the use of punitive damages for marginal deterrence, which leads to more pre-
cise conclusions about punishment.
I explained earlier that punitive damages arise only when the defendant be-
haved very badly.  In the usual case, only intentional wrongs, or nearly inten-
tional wrongs, are bad enough for punitive damages.  The extent of damages
thus depends upon distinguishing between intentional and unintentional
wrongs.  I will develop a distinction appropriate to an economic theory of dam-
ages.
A.  Lapses
Table 1 describes incentive effects that influence rational actors.  Tort li-
ability, however, often arises from diminished rationality.  Rationality dimin-
ishes when people mistakenly assess facts.  In cases of unintended wrongs, the
actor does not know that he is doing something wrong.  To illustrate, I may
drive too fast because I do not notice that I am near a school.  When a wrong is
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unintended, the actor does not foresee possible punishment, so it cannot deter
him.  Similarly, in cases of under-appreciated risks, the actor under-estimates
the risk that he imposes on others.  To illustrate, I mistakenly think that asbes-
tos dust poses only a small risk of lung cancer to my employees.  When a risk is
under-appreciated, liability will not cause the actor to internalize the full bene-
fit of precaution.
Lapses in attention often cause unintended wrongs and under-appreciated
risks.  More vigilance by the actor reduces the frequency of lapses in attention.
By “vigilance” I mean self-monitoring activities by which an actor controls his
behavior.  An account of rational self-monitoring provides the foundation for a
theory of deterrence applied to unintended wrongs and under-appreciated
risks.
A rationally self-interested actor balances the cost of self-monitoring and
the reduction in expected liability from lapses.  Liability for perfectly compen-
satory damages makes the injurer internalize the expected cost of harm.  So, as-
suming certain ideal conditions including perfectly compensatory damages, a
liability rule causes efficient self-monitoring by a rational actor.26
As explained, perfect compensation is impossible in principle for wrongs re-
sulting in uncompensable harms.  I propose to compute damages in such cases
by the risk-equivalence method.  Risk-equivalent damages create incentives to
rationalize precaution.  Specifically, risk-equivalent damages provide incentives
to equalize the increase in safety obtained by investing more resources in all
types of precaution, including self-monitoring.  So, assuming certain ideal con-
ditions including risk-equivalent damages, a liability rule causes efficient self-
monitoring by a rational actor.
The law often does not apply a legal standard to self-monitoring.  To illus-
trate, consider failing to stop for a stop sign.  Failing to stop at a stop sign is
negligent, and the driver is liable for the consequences.  Everyone, however,
occasionally lapses and fails to stop at stop signs.  The law, however, does not
                                                          
26. The assumptions include costless, error-free application of liability rules by courts.  Also in-
cluded are certain assumptions about the connection between lapses and liability. Note that actors can
have deficient incentives for self-monitoring under a negligence rule when some lapses result in non-
negligent injuries.  For example, a lapse in my attention causes me to apply the breaks slower than
otherwise, thus resulting in an accident.  The law, however, may decide that I applied the breaks soon
enough to satisfy the legal standard of care.  Consequently, the law concludes that I was not negligent
and not liable.  In this example, I externalize part of the benefit of more intensive self-monitoring.
Specifically, I externalize the reduction in non-negligent harms caused by more intensive self-
monitoring.  In this case, liability law does not create incentives for efficient self-monitoring.
This problem cannot arise when all injuries caused by lapses result in liability.  To illustrate, con-
sider self-monitoring of stop signs by drivers.  Every time I unintentionally run a stop sign, I am negli-
gent and liable for the resulting harm.  Consequently, I internalize the reduction in harm caused by
more intensive self-monitoring of stop signs.  I assume that self-monitoring to stop at stop signs does
not spill over to the reduction of liability from accidents with causes other than failing to stop at stop
signs.
In this discussion, I have not distinguished between the two major forms of the liability rule: strict
liability and negligence.  The former is simpler than the latter, but my generalizations hold with some
qualifications under both rules.  For an especially careful explanation of the difference in the context
of punitive damages, see Polinsky & Shavell, Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 878-85.
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allow the driver to defend himself by proving that he inadvertently runs stop
signs less often than most other people do.  A high level of self-monitoring pro-
vides no defense for a lapse.
In this respect, self-monitoring by individuals resembles quality control by
manufacturers.  To illustrate, a Coca-Cola manufacturer has to monitor the
bottles to make sure they contain no defects that could cause them to explode.
More intensive and costly quality control results in fewer defective bottles.  De-
fective bottles sometimes slip through even the best system of quality control.
When a defective bottle injures a consumer, the law holds the manufacturer li-
able, without allowing a defense that its quality control was best.27  The manu-
facturer’s quality control resembles the driver’s self-monitoring, and the defec-
tive bottle resembles the driver running the stop sign.  The court does not have
the information to create and apply a standard of self-monitoring to individuals
or a standard of quality control in manufacturing.
Now I return to the connection between intention and damages.  Liability
for unintended harms causes injurers to internalize the benefits of self-
monitoring.  Thus liability for unintended harms causes actors to balance the
cost of self-monitoring against the benefit of fewer lapses, as required for effi-
cient incentives.  Conversely, imposing extra-compensatory damages measured
relative to the baseline of perfect compensation or risk-equivalent damages,
provides incentives for excessive self-monitoring.  In other words, extra-
compensatory damages create incentives for unreasonably costly vigilance.
Thus the liability of injurers should typically equal, but not exceed, compensa-
tory damages.
I used the concept of rational self-monitoring to build a theory of lapses.  In
this paper, I will not attempt to achieve greater realism by adjusting the model
of rational self-monitoring in light of psychology.28
B.  Punishment
Instead of lapsing, however, some actors impose excessive risk on others by
intentionally violating standards of law and morality.  Deterring their wrong-
doing requires punishment.  I will distinguish three motives for intentional
wrongdoing, each with its own logic of deterrence.
First consider intentional wrongdoing motivated by errors in enforcing
compensatory damages.  To illustrate, assume that perfect compensation of the
victim requires damages of $10,000, and assume that problems of detection and
proof cause the injurer to be held liable with probability 1/2. An injurer’s ex-
pected liability for compensatory damages thus equals $5,000.  Assume the cost
of compliance with the legal standard of care costs $6,000.  Under these as-
                                                          
27. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
28. For a good discussion of the need for psychology to correct economics in the study of tort, see
Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42
UCLA L. REV. 377 (1995).
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sumptions, the rationally self-interested injurer intentionally does wrong in or-
der to save $1,000 in expected costs.
Punitive damages can offset enforcement errors and restore efficient deter-
rence to the liability system.  In this example, a punitive multiple of 2/1 restores
the injurer’s expected liability to $10,000, as required for deterrence.  Since the
punitive multiple of 2/1 equals the reciprocal of the enforcement error 1/2, I call
this method for computing punitive damages the rule of the reciprocal.29  The
rule of the reciprocal applies to most cases of fraud by individuals and self-
seeking by firms.
When applying the rule of the reciprocal, courts should not award punitive
damages in cases like the Exxon Valdez, where an oil tanker ran aground.
Since the whole world was sure to know about the accident, a rational actor like
this large corporation would not expect to escape liability.
Some kinds of enforcement errors do not distort incentives and do not re-
quire correction by adjusting damages.  Expected costs usually jump at the
boundary between permitted and forbidden acts.  Because of the jump in costs,
most rational actors will conform to the legal standard in spite of enforcement
errors.  If costs jump by a large amount at the legal standard, then a damage
multiple is unnecessary to offset enforcement errors and to deter wrongdoing
by rational actors.  Conversely, if costs jump by a small amount at the legal
standard, then reciprocal damages are necessary to offset enforcement errors
and to deter wrongdoing by rational actors.  In general, the necessity of recip-
rocal damages to deter wrongdoing depends upon the relative size of the en-
forcement error and the jump in liability costs at the legal standard.
Malice is a second motive for intentional wrongdoing.  The assailant who
insults me and breaks my nose presumably derives something valuable from his
act, such as satisfaction.  Subjective satisfaction is difficult to observe and often
impossible to measure.  Consequently, no rule exists for computing the pun-
ishment required to deter malicious acts.  Although tailoring punishment to in-
dividuals is difficult, statistical evidence can show the average relationship be-
tween punishment and deterrence.  As with criminal fines, the calibration of
punitive damages for malice must rely upon such aggregate statistics.
Self-seeking firms may pursue profits unscrupulously but not maliciously.
Malicious acts by employees divert the firm’s resources from the pursuit of
profits.  The directors and managers of the firm have an incentive to monitor
employees to prevent the diversion of its resources.  Consequently, malice by
employees typically results from imperfect monitoring by the firm.  Imperfect
monitoring of employees by the firm resembles imperfect self-monitoring of
the individual, which brings me to the next kind of wrongdoing.
A third motive for wrongdoing occurs in cases involving reckless disregard
for the safety of others.  Actors who disregard risks are often in special emo-
                                                          
29. See Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and How Much, 40 ALA. L.
REV. 1143, 1148 (1989).  For further discussion and mathematical notation, see COOTER & ULEN, su-
pra note 10, at 506-45.
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tional states, such as the young man suffering from Saturday night fever.
Heightened emotions can cause excessive discounting of risk and futurity.  In
such circumstances, the actor needs the threat of punishment to acquire better
discipline and control over his emotions.  Efficient self-monitoring requires pu-
nitive damages in such cases, not merely compensatory damages.  Social scien-
tists have not developed or tested precise theories about how punishing reck-
less behavior causes people to gain self-control.  (An elaboration of the model
of lapses can provide the foundation for developing such a model.30)  Conse-
quently, I know of no rule for computing optimal punishment in such cases.
A similar analysis applies to a firm.  Idiosyncratic directors and managers
may apply very high discount rates to risk and futurity, which results in reckless
behavior.  Deterring such behavior requires the punishment of the directors
and managers.  I know of no rule for computing optimal punishment in such
cases.  Similarly, a lapse in monitoring by directors and managers may allow a
deviant employee recklessly to endanger customers or the public.  The imposi-
tion of punishment on the firm, as opposed to the individual wrongdoers, pun-
ishes the stockholders or consumers for not monitoring the directors, managers,
or employees who committed the wrong.
VI
CONCLUSION
Law and morality forbid acts that cause uncompensable harms or create un-
reasonable risks.  When people intentionally commit such acts, courts express
anger and indignation at the wrongdoer through speech and punishment.  Civil
courts correctly draw upon the righteous anger of jurors over intentional
wrongs to chastise the actor and harm his reputation.  In a system of social
norms with multiple equilibria, expressions of emotion signal commitment and
coordinate expectations.  In a system of social norms with a unique, stable
equilibrium, sanctions deter marginally.  Social norms, however, provide a bet-
ter guide to the need for punitive damages than to their extent.  Courts make a
serious error in asking jurors to assign punitive damages without providing de-
tailed instructions on their computation.  The court in a typical case should im-
pose the minimum punishment required to deter wrongdoing.
                                                          
30. See the model of imprudence in Robert D. Cooter, Self-Control and Self-Improvement for the
“Bad Man” of Holmes, 78 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1998).  In an earlier paper on lapses, I argued
that optimal deterrence of wrongdoing caused by excessive discounting of future punishments could be
effected by applying mild fines with high probability.  See Robert D. Cooter, Lapses, Conflict, and Ak-
rasia in Torts and Crimes: Towards an Economic Theory of the Will, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 149
(1991) (reversing Becker’s classic formula in which optimal deterrence requires severe fines with low
probability).  For Becker’s formula, see Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,
76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
